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DOPING APPEALS AT THE COURT OF 
ARBITRATION FOR SPORT: LESSONS 
FROM ESSENDON 
Abstract: In recent years, there has been an increase in the growth of the sports 
industry globally. With it has come the growth of global sports arbitration. The 
Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), created in part because of the increase in 
sport-related arbitration, is designed to promote efficiency and uniformity in the 
resolution of disputes. Despite the noteworthy objectives of the CAS, recent de-
velopments, such as the supplement scandal surrounding the Essendon Football 
Club of the Australian Football League, highlight the pressure that endures be-
tween individual athletes and sport governing bodies. This pressure is especially 
clear in instances where athletes are found guilty of doping under the World Anti-
Doping Agency (“WADA”) code, and the finding is appealed to the CAS. This 
Note, although recognizing the benefits of the CAS and the WADA code, argues 
that in light of recent events, individual athlete’s goals should be given a greater 
weight in doping appeals at the CAS. This Note also assesses whether specific 
amendments to the CAS code could achieve this change, and how effective such 
amendments would be. 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, sport has brought cultures together, acting as a diplomatic 
tool to mitigate the effects of inter-state conflicts and transcend religious, lin-
guistic, and social differences.1 Recent events, however, have hampered the 
efficacy of sport as a means to bring societies together to promote peace, and 
have highlighted the need for strict oversight of sport governing bodies.2 These 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Adopting Resolution, General Assembly Reaffirms Role of Sport in Promoting Sustaina-
ble Development, Reconciliation in Strife-Torn Areas, UNITED NATIONS (Oct. 26, 2015), http://
www.un.org/press/en/2015/ga11712.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/H873-F9G3] (highlighting the U.N.’s 
commitment to using sport as a developmental tool in “areas of conflict”); Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://eca.state.gov/programs-initiatives/sports-diplomacy [https://
perma.cc/887F-QASD] (describing efforts to use “sports diplomacy” to bridge “sociocultural differ-
ences” and “bring people together”); Spotlight on Landmark Vatican Conference on Faith and Sport, 
VATICAN RADIO (Oct. 4, 2016, 2:53 P.M.), https://web.archive.org/web/20161110224005/
http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2016/10/04/spotlight_on_landmark_vatican_conference_on_faith_
and_sport_/1262782 (describing a Vatican conference encouraging the use of sport to promote com-
passion and respect). The Olympic Charter aims to use sport to serve “the harmonious development of 
humankind” and recognizes that sport is a “human right.” INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., OLYMPIC CHAR-
TER 13 (2015), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4BZZ-KSBG]. 
 2 See Adam Hofstetter, Can Sports Bring World Peace?, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 2010), http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/01/can-sports-bring-world-peace/307872/ [https://
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changes in the world of sport over the past twenty years have created other 
new challenges.3 Specifically, as sport transforms into a worldwide industry, 
individual athletes are often disadvantaged.4 For example, top Olympic offi-
cials enjoy the fruits of lucrative media and sponsorship agreements from the 
Olympic Games at the expense of Olympic athletes, who may only receive a 
fraction of this money.5 Moreover, the issues faced by modern athletes raise 
the broader question of how to better promote both the rights of individual ath-
letes as well as the rights of sporting organizations.6 
One reform involves an alteration to the balance of power between indi-
vidual athletes and sport governing bodies, especially in international sport 
arbitration.7 In particular, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”)—
regarded as the highest court for international sport disputes—could play an 
important role in such reform.8 Reform of the CAS could have a particularly 
beneficial effect on athletes accused of doping violations under the World Anti-
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/JQ63-KGW5] (describing the deadly attack on the Togo national soccer team during the 
2010 Africa Cup of Nations Tournament); see also Bruce Bean, An Interim Essay on FIFA’s World 
Cup of Corruption: The Desperate Need for International Corporate Governance Standards at FIFA, 
22 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 367, 385 (2016) (advocating for greater corporate governance over 
FIFA in the wake of its 2015 corruption scandal); Leon Siciliano & Sophie Jamieson, FIFA: A Time-
line of Corruption—In 90 Seconds, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 22, 2016, 11:04 A.M.), http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/football/2016/03/22/fifa-a-timeline-of-corruption-in-90-seconds/ [https://perma.
cc/L3VS-5TPR] (summarizing major events in the 2015 FIFA corruption scandal). 
 3 See George Wright, Sport and Globalization: The Meaning of Globalization, OLYMPIC REV. 
(Olympic Studies Centre), 1999, at 17–19, http://library.la84.org/OlympicInformationCenter/Olympic
Review/1999/OREXXVI29/OREXXVI29q.pdf [https://perma.cc/84SK-FK9D] (discussing the link 
between globalization and sport). One change witnessed in the sports world is the increased “imple-
mentation by the owners and managers of sport of globalized strategies designed to generate enor-
mous profits.” Id. at 17. One challenge is addressing the difference in pay between IOC members and 
U.S. Olympic athletes. Will Hobson, Olympic Executives Cash in on a ‘Movement’ That Keeps Ath-
letes Poor, WASH. POST (July 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/olympics/olympic-
executives-cash-in-on-a-movement-that-keeps-athletes-poor/2016/07/30/ed18c206-5346-11e6-88eb-
7dda4e2f2aec_story.html?utm_term=.8b6a4f224f0b [https://perma.cc/GA5W-4C5Z]. 
 4 See Hobson, supra note 3 (discussing the financial challenges of many Olympic athletes). 
 5 Id. 
 6 See generally, e.g., id. (discussing balance of power between individual Olympic athletes and 
the organizations that compose the Olympic Movement). 
 7 See Antoine Duval, The Rules of the Game: Three Pillars for a Reform of the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport: Independence, Transparency and Access to Justice, PLAY THE GAME (Dec. 4, 2015), http://
playthegame.org/news/comments/2015/019_three-pillars-for-a-reform-of-the-court-of-arbitration-for-
sport-independence-transparency-and-access-to-justice/ [https://perma.cc/KKB7-LHRG] (proposing 
reforms to be made at the CAS). 
 8 See id.; Ron Katz, The Supreme Court of Sport Needs to Be Reformed, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2016, 
12:36 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rkatz/2016/09/02/the-supreme-court-of-sport-needs-to-be-
reformed/#6ff0ba937d7f [https://web.archive.org/web/20161123001648/https://www.forbes.com/
sites/rkatz/2016/09/02/the-supreme-court-of-sport-needs-to-be-reformed/] (advocating for CAS re-
form). CAS is an independent tribunal designed to resolve sports related legal disputes through arbi-
tration. Frequently Asked Questions, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-
information/frequently-asked-questions.html [https://perma.cc/DE3G-F4MF]. The CAS is headquar-
tered in Lausanne, Switzerland, and has regional offices in New York, USA and Sydney, Australia. Id. 
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Doping Agency (“WADA”) code.9 Moreover, improving the independence of 
the CAS could also improve its functioning and its image.10 The recent sup-
plement scandal at the Essendon Football Club (“Essendon”) in the Australian 
Football League (“AFL”), resulting in the suspension of thirty-four of the 
club’s players, exemplifies the need for reform.11 
Part I of this note summarizes the structural, procedural, and jurisdictional 
aspects of the CAS, provides an overview of WADA, and summarizes the in-
teraction between the two bodies.12 Additionally, Part I stresses the historical 
and current need for global sport governing bodies.13 Part II engages in a discus-
sion of the past issues faced by the CAS as well as WADA, the reforms made by 
CAS and WADA, and concludes with a synopsis of recent appeals at the CAS, 
which involve WADA and doping violations.14 Part III of this note affirms the 
advantages and importance of the CAS and WADA, but argues that the balance 
of power between athletes should be adjusted to better represent athletes’ inter-
ests in doping appeals at the CAS.15 In particular, Part III of this note explores 
whether a more customized approach between athletes and sports organizations 
would be effective, and also considers whether specific amendments to the CAS 
Code could alleviate some of the tensions discussed in Part II.16 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT  
AND THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY 
This part provides a historical overview of both the CAS and the WADA, 
as well as examines the interplay between these two bodies.17 Specifically, 
Section A examines the history, structure, and jurisdiction of the CAS.18 Sec-
tion B turns to the history of WADA.19 Finally, Section C discusses the interac-
tion between the CAS and WADA.20 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Maureen A. Weston, Doping Control, Mandatory Arbitration, and Process Dangers for 
Accused Athletes in International Sports, 10 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 5, 47–48 (2009) (discussing the 
need for “[m]eaningful [h]earing [r]ights” in doping proceedings at the CAS). 
 10 Rachelle Downie, Improving the Performance of Sport’s Ultimate Umpire: Reforming the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport, 12 MELB. J. INT’L L. 315, 335 (2011). 
 11 See Katz, supra note 8 (proposing reforms to the CAS); Roy Masters, Essendon CAS Verdict: 
Inside the Court of Arbitration for Sport’s Decision, THE AGE (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.theage.
com.au/afl/afl-news/essendon-cas-verdict-inside-the-court-of-arbitration-for-sports-decision-2016
0111-gm3tb5.html [https://perma.cc/72ZN-VA9P] (discussing CAS verdict). 
 12 See infra notes 21–81 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 21–81 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 82–174 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 175–232 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 175–232 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 21–81 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 21–48 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 49–71 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 72–81 and accompanying text. 
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A. The History, Structure, and Jurisdiction of the Court of  
Arbitration for Sport 
During the 1980s, it became apparent that there was a need for a single, 
global sport arbitration body.21 This need was due to the increase in sport-
related arbitration, the lack of a tribunal specialized in sport disputes, the lack 
of a sufficiently cost-effective manner of resolving such disputes, and the lack 
of binding, uniform decisions.22 To address these deficiencies, Judge Kéba 
Mbaye, then-member of both the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) 
and the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), formed a committee to formu-
late the founding statutes of the CAS.23 As a result of this effort, the IOC rati-
fied the statutes, and the CAS was established in 1984.24 
Today, the sport industry continues to grow.25 In addition to the increased 
economic value of the sport industry, sport arbitrations at the CAS have also 
increased.26 For example, in 2003, the CAS heard one hundred cases in one 
year for the first time.27 As of 2016, the CAS hears over 350 cases per year.28 
The CAS maintains a list of roughly three hundred arbitrators of 87 dif-
ferent nationalities.29 The CAS hears a wide range of sport-related disputes and 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See Downie, supra note 10, at 316–17 (noting the disadvantage of resolving sport disputes in 
“piecemeal fashion,” and summarizing the creation of the CAS); History of the CAS, CT. ARB. FOR 
SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/general-information/history-of-the-cas.html [https://perma.cc/
7B6M-LGKH] (same). 
 22 Downie, supra note 10, at 316–17; History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
 23 Downie, supra note 10, at 316–17; History of the CAS, supra note 21. “The IOC is a not-for-
profit independent international organisation” designed to “build[] a better world through sport.” The 
International Olympic Committee, INT’L OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, https://www.olympic.org/the-ioc 
[https://perma.cc/NEZ3-B38N]. The revenue generated by the IOC is used to fund “athletes and sports 
organisations at all levels around the world.” Id. 
 24 History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
 25 See Darren Heitner, Sports Industry to Reach $73.5 Billion by 2019, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2015, 
7:15 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2015/10/19/sports-industry-to-reach-73-5-
billion-by-2019/#575927061585 [https://web.archive.org/web/20180220162404/http://www.forbes.
com/sites/darrenheitner/2015/10/19/sports-industry-to-reach-73-5-billion-by-2019/] (explaining that a 
significant force behind such growth is the greater revenue from “media rights deals”). 
 26 Antoine Duval & Giandonato Marino, Quantifying the Court of Arbitration for Sport, ASSER 
INT’L SPORTS BLOG (May 23, 2014), http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/quantifying-the-court-
of-arbitration-for-sport-by-antoine-duval-and-gianni-marino [https://perma.cc/FEX7-L2UN] (discuss-
ing the increasing frequency of sports arbitration at the CAS). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. In general, CAS arbitration takes between six and twelve months to complete. Frequently 
Asked Questions, supra note 8. As for the appellate arbitration procedure, “[i]n the absence of a time 
limit set in the statutes or regulations of the federation, association or sports-related body concerned, 
or in a previous agreement, the time limit for appeal shall be twenty-one days from the receipt of the 
decision appealed against.” Code: Procedural Rules, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT R49, http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/arbitration/code-procedural-rules.html#c251 [https://perma.cc/57MZ-9LCW]. Once the 
arbitration panel has been formed to hear the appeal, “the operative part of the award shall be commu-
nicated to the parties within three months after the transfer of the file to the Panel.” Id. at R59. 
 29 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 8. 
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is mainly comprised of two divisions: the Ordinary Arbitration Division and 
the Appeals Arbitration Division.30 The Ordinary Arbitration Division hears 
disputes of a purely contractual nature, while the Appeals Arbitration Division 
deals with the resolution of disputes over decisions taken by a sport organiza-
tion.31 Parties to CAS arbitration proceedings include individual athletes, me-
dia companies, clubs, and sports federations.32 
A panel of three arbitrators, who are chosen from the CAS list, hear arbi-
trations.33 The selection procedure varies depending on which CAS division 
the dispute is submitted to.34 For a dispute before the Ordinary Arbitration Di-
vision, each party selects its own arbitrator from the CAS list, while both par-
ties together select the third arbitrator, who acts as president of the panel.35 For 
a dispute before the Appeals Arbitration Division, the process is similar in that 
each party selects its own arbitrator from the CAS list.36 The Appeals process 
differs in the selection of the third arbitrator who acts as president of the panel; 
the President of the Appeals Arbitration Division selects the third arbitrator 
rather than the parties.37 
In each dispute before the CAS, the three-arbitrator panel first determines 
whether it has jurisdiction.38 In general, the CAS has jurisdiction to hear a dis-
pute only if the parties already have an arbitration agreement in place that ex-
pressly states that in the event of arbitration, the CAS will hear the dispute.39 A 
party may object to jurisdiction as a preliminary matter, in which case the court 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Id. Roughly 90% of cases heard by the CAS are heard by the Appeals Arbitration Division. 
Louise Reilly, Introduction to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) & the Role of National Courts 
in International Sports Disputes, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 65. In addition, approximately 30% of CAS 
cases are doping-related. Id. at 70. In addition to the Ordinary Arbitration Division and the Appeals 
Arbitration Division, the CAS also contains an Ad Hoc Division and a Mediation Division. Id. at 65. 
The Ad Hoc Division is available to hear appeals during “major sports events” such as the Olympic 
Games, while the Mediation Division is available to parties in advance of entering into “an ordinary 
arbitration procedure.” Id. 
 31 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 8. For example, the Ordinary Arbitration Division 
would hear challenges over “sponsorship contracts; licensing; and broadcasting and media rights[]” 
while the Appeals Arbitration Division would hear challenges such as “transfer and compensation 
disputes related to football and disciplinary sanctions for anti-doping rule violations[] . . . .” Reilly, 
supra note 30, at 64–65. 
 32 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 8. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. (describing the ordinary selection procedure and the appeals selection procedure). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. The President of the Appeals Arbitration Division is appointed by the International Council 
of Arbitration for Sport (“ICAS”), a twenty-member body tasked with the “administration and financ-
ing of the CAS” as well as facilitating “the settlement of sports-related disputes through arbitration.” 
Code: Statutes of ICAS and CAS, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/icas/code-statutes-
of-icas-and-cas.html [https://perma.cc/384E-FCH5]. 
 38 Code: Procedural Rules, supra note 28, at R39. 
 39 History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
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must allow the opposing party to file a written submission on the issue of ju-
risdiction.40 Finally, the governing CAS Code makes clear that this decision is 
to be made regardless of whether another action concerning the same subject 
matter between the parties is pending in another tribunal.41 
The CAS is shaped by statutes and procedural rules.42 Procedural Rule 
27, entitled “Application of the Rules,” sets out two main instances in which 
parties may bring disputes to the CAS.43 First, parties may bring a dispute to 
the CAS if they had a previous arbitration agreement in place providing for 
recourse to the CAS.44 Second, a dispute may be brought to the CAS in the 
form of an appeal against a decision by a sports association if the statutes of 
the association provide for appeals to the CAS.45 For instance, the statutes of 
the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) state that all dis-
putes are to be resolved by the CAS and prohibit the seeking of relief in a do-
mestic court of law, and that appeals against a FIFA decision may be made ex-
clusively to the CAS only if internal remedies were exhausted.46 Finally, Pro-
                                                                                                                           
 40 Id. The panel, however, makes the final decision regarding jurisdiction. Id. Furthermore, the 
CAS has jurisdiction solely over disputes related to sport. Code: Procedural Rules, supra note 28, at 
R27; History of the CAS, supra note 21. As a practical matter, however, the CAS has never found it 
lacked jurisdiction over a dispute on the grounds that the subject matter was insufficiently related to 
sport. History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
 41 Code: Procedural Rules, supra note 28, at R39. R39 provides, inter alia, that “[t]he panel shall 
rule on its own jurisdiction, irrespective of any legal action already pending before a State court or 
another arbitral tribunal relating to the same object between the same parties, unless substantive 
grounds require a suspension of proceedings.” Id. 
 42 Code: Statutes of ICAS and CAS, supra note 37. Although the statutes and procedural rules 
control the CAS and the ICAS, the procedural rules are only applicable to the CAS. See Code: Proce-
dural Rules, supra note 28, at R27. 
 43 Code: Procedural Rules, supra note 28, at R27. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at R47. R47 specifically provides: 
 An appeal against the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body 
may be filed with [the] CAS if the statutes or regulations of the said body so provide or 
if the parties have concluded a specific arbitration agreement and if the Appellant has 
exhausted the legal remedies available to it prior to the appeal, in accordance with the 
statutes or regulations of that body. 
 An appeal may be filed with [the] CAS against an award rendered by [the] CAS act-
ing as a first instance tribunal if such appeal has been expressly provided by the rules of 
the federation or sports-body concerned. 
Id. 
 46 FIFA, FIFA STATUTES 54–55 (Apr. 2016), http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/
generic/02/78/29/07/fifastatutsweben_neutral.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CNX-BSMN]. The statute specif-
ically provides in relevant part that the CAS has the power to “resolve disputes between FIFA, mem-
ber associations, confederations, leagues, clubs, players, officials, intermediaries and licensed match 
agents.” Id. at 54. The statutes further state that “[r]ecourse to ordinary courts of law is prohibited 
unless specifically provided for in the FIFA regulations.” Id. at 55. Moreover, the statutes add that 
“[r]ecourse may only be made to [the] CAS after all other internal channels have been exhausted” and 
grant FIFA and WADA rights to appeal. Id. at 54–55. 
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cedural Rule 57 provides that the CAS panel has complete power to conduct a 
review of the facts and the law and may exclude evidence in specific instances.47 
The ability to hear appeals and the broad scope of review it has when doing so 
means that the CAS plays an important role in sports-related dispute resolu-
tion.48 
B. The History of the World Anti-Doping Agency 
Like the CAS, the WADA has come to play an important role in interna-
tional sport.49 WADA is an international, independent agency designed to 
combat doping in sport.50 Established in 1999 pursuant to the Lausanne Decla-
ration on Doping in Sport, WADA is based in Montréal, Canada and is sup-
ported by four regional offices throughout the world.51 A Foundation Board 
and an Executive Committee are the main bodies that govern WADA.52 Origi-
nally, the Olympic Movement funded WADA exclusively, but since 2002, 
funding has been split equally among the Olympic Movement and national 
governments.53 WADA promotes the advancement of uniform, worldwide anti-
                                                                                                                           
 47 Code: Procedural Rules, supra note 28, at R57. 
 48 History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
 49 See Code Signatories, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wada-ama.org/en/code-
signatories#GovernmentFundedOrganizations [https://perma.cc/E9PG-8MK8] (listing the signatories 
to the WADA Code). 
 50 Who We Are, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wada-ama.org/en/who-we-are 
[https://perma.cc/J77P-QND8]. In general, doping refers to the practice of using prohibited substances 
or methods to gain a competitive advantage. What Is Doping?, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/
new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/anti-doping/youth-space/what-is-doping/ [https://perma.cc/
RC4Y-KS6F]. 
 51 Regional Offices, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wada-ama.org/en/regional-
offices [https://perma.cc/7YDD-U9BZ]; Who We Are, supra note 50. The IOC organized the World 
Conference on Doping in February of 1999, which produced the Lausanne Declaration. Who We Are, 
supra note 50. The Conference and the Declaration, which ultimately established WADA, was 
prompted by the “Festina affair”—the expulsion from the Tour de France of an entire cycling team 
after the coach admitted to providing illegal drugs to the team members. Samuel Abt, Top Team Ex-
pelled by Tour de France over Drug Charges, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/
1998/07/18/sports/top-team-expelled-by-tour-de-france-over-drug-charges.html [https://perma.cc/
TF8J-6FTT]; The Festina Affair, THE GUARDIAN (July 9, 2008, 6:07 P.M.), https://www.theguardian.
com/sport/gallery/2008/jul/09/tourdefrance.cycling [https://perma.cc/VY8C-KR3F]. See generally 
Governance, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wada-ama.org/en/governance [https://
perma.cc/EWE4-3BHY] (describing the structure of WADA, which includes a “Foundation Board,” 
an “Executive Board,” and numerous committees). 
 52 Governance, supra note 51. WADA is also partially governed by several other committees, 
such as the Education Committee, the Compliance Review Committee, and the Athlete Committee. Id. 
 53 Funding, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wada-ama.org/en/funding [https://
perma.cc/VRS4-W3VS]. The Olympic Movement is “the concerted, organised, universal and perma-
nent action, carried out under the supreme authority of the IOC, of all individuals and entities who are 
inspired by the values of Olympism.” OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 1, at 13. The Olympic Move-
ment is chiefly composed of the IOC, the IFs, and the National Olympic Committees (“NOCs”). Id. at 
17. 
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doping standards through the provisions contained in the World Anti-Doping 
Code (“WADA Code”), which entered into force in 2004.54 
The WADA Code is the principal document containing WADA’s rules and 
policies.55 There are over six hundred sports organizations throughout the 
world that are signatories to the WADA Code, including the IOC and National 
Anti-Doping Organizations (“NADOs”).56 By signing and accepting the WA-
DA Code, the signatory agrees to bind itself to the principles articulated in the 
Code, and further agrees to implement and enforce the provisions of the 
Code.57 WADA acts as a watchdog, monitoring the signatories to ensure they 
are effectively carrying out and enforcing the Code.58 Particularly significant is 
Article 13.2.1 of the WADA Code, which provides that a decision involving an 
“International Event” or “International-Level Athletes” can only be appealed to 
the CAS.59 
Although the WADA Code is not itself binding authority on any member 
organization, WADA requires member organizations to adopt their own anti-
doping rules consistent with the WADA Code.60 For example, the WADA Code 
mandates that the IOC adopt anti-doping rules consistent with the WADA 
Code, and that International Sports Federations (“IFs”), in order to be recog-
nized by the IOC, must also comply with the WADA Code.61 In addition, the 
WADA Code requires that, as a prerequisite to participation in the Olympics, 
any athlete or other personnel such as trainers and coaches consent to adhere to 
anti-doping rules consistent with the WADA Code.62 
                                                                                                                           
 54 The Code, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wada-ama.org/en/what-we-do/the-
code [https://perma.cc/HPJ8-JBUE]; WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE 11 
(2015), https://www.wada-ama.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/wada-2015-world-anti-doping-
code.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5CE-BLYB] [hereinafter WADA CODE]. The Code’s main purposes are 
to “protect the fundamental right [of athletes] to participate in doping-free sport,” encourage “health, 
fairness and equality” among athletes, and secure “harmonized, coordinated and effective” anti-
doping efforts. WADA CODE, supra, at 11. 
 55 WADA CODE, supra note 54, at 11. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 82. Article 13.2.1 provides that “[i]n cases arising from participation in an International 
Event or in cases involving International-Level Athletes, the decision may be appealed exclusively to 
CAS.” Id. Appendix 1 of the WADA Code defines an “International Event” as “[a]n Event or Compe-
tition where the International Olympic Committee, the International Paralympic Committee, an Inter-
national Federation, a Major Event Organization, or another international sports organization is the 
ruling body for the Event or appoints the technical officials for the Event.” Id. at 135. Appendix 1 goes 
on to define an “International-Level Athlete” as one who “compete[s] in sport at the international 
level, as defined by each International Federation, consistent with the International Standard for Test-
ing and Investigations.” Id. at 136. 
 60 Reilly, supra note 30, at 70; WADA CODE, supra note 54, at 102 (Articles 20.1.1–.2). 
 61 Reilly, supra note 30, at 70; WADA CODE, supra note 54, at 102 (Articles 20.1.1–.2). 
 62 WADA CODE, supra note 54, at 102 (Article 20.1.6). 
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In addition to overseeing global anti-doping enforcement and compliance, 
WADA is involved in many other tasks, such as increasing awareness of the 
dangers of doping through educational outreach and supporting scientific re-
search designed to increase detection of banned substances.63 There are a 
number of signatories to the Code, including Olympic Member Sport Federa-
tions, National Olympic Committees, government-funded organizations, and 
other independent sporting organizations.64 
Regarding investigations, WADA acts as an overseer of IFs as well as 
NADOs to ensure their compliance with the Code.65 WADA makes clear that it 
is not involved in the punishment of athletes in instances where analysis of a 
lab sample shows the presence of a banned substance.66 Instead of meting out 
punishments for doping violations, WADA acts as an appellate body.67 WADA 
can exercise this appellate jurisdiction only after the NADO or IF has complet-
ed its investigation and decided on the proper punishment.68 An example of 
WADA’s appellate ability is contained in the FIFA statutes, which states that 
WADA has the right to appeal to the CAS any doping decision passed by FIFA 
or its affiliates.69 Then, WADA may assess whether the relevant adjudication of 
the particular doping violation was in compliance with the Code; if WADA 
determines that the adjudication may not have been in compliance, it may ap-
peal the decision to the CAS.70 The CAS decision regarding a WADA appeal is 
considered final and cannot be appealed further, except if required by law re-
lating to the nullification or implementation of an award.71 
                                                                                                                           
 63 Education & Prevention, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wada-ama.org/en/
education-prevention [https://perma.cc/Q6E5-N4W7]; Research, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, 
https://www.wada-ama.org/en/research [https://perma.cc/4SQA-SCTM]. 
 64 See Code Signatories, supra note 49 (listing the signatories to the WADA Code). 
 65 WADA’s Role in Results Management, WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, https://www.wada-
ama.org/en/questions-answers/wadas-role-in-results-management [https://perma.cc/QMY9-AL8S]. 
 66 Id. WADA calls such instances “adverse analytical findings.” Id. In such instances, WADA 
only receives a “certificate of analysis” reporting the lab finding; it does not receive the name of any 
individual athlete. Id. 
 67 Id. The NADOs or IFs are responsible for punishment. Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 FIFA STATUTES, supra note 46, at 55. The full text of the relevant provision provides that 
“[t]he World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is entitled to appeal to CAS against any internally final 
and binding doping-related decision passed in particular by the FIFA, the confederations, member 
associations or leagues in accordance with the provisions set out in the FIFA Anti-Doping Regula-
tions.” Id. 
 70 WADA CODE, supra note 54, at 81–83. The Code provides that cases involving international 
athletes or participation in an international sporting event “may be appealed exclusively to CAS.” Id. 
at 82. As to which parties may appeal in such instances, Article 13.2.3 specifically names the parties, 
which include the individual athlete, the athlete’s national anti-doping organization, and WADA, as 
parties to whom appeal is available. Id. at 83–84. 
 71 Id. at 82 (see Comment to Article 13.2.1). For example, the Swiss Private International Law Act 
permits CAS awards to be appealed to the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland. LUCIEN W. VALLONI 
& ALWIN KELLER, FRORIEP, NOTES ON THE SWISS FEDERAL COURT’S PRACTICE REGARDING THE AD-
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C. The Interaction Between the CAS and WADA 
As discussed, WADA creates and supports the WADA Code, in an effort to 
combat doping in sport, as well as supervises IFs and NADOs.72 In some cases, 
WADA may appeal decisions to the CAS.73 CAS and WADA are both influential 
forces in the lives of athletes competing internationally.74 For example, athletes 
typically waive their right to relief from domestic courts, instead agreeing to ar-
bitration clauses that mandate disputes be submitted to the CAS.75 
Furthermore, athletes participating in international competitions are indi-
rectly bound to agree to the Code.76 Under WADA rules, athletes are required 
to submit to CAS jurisdiction regarding any arbitration.77 In addition, a third 
party unrelated to the dispute, such as WADA, can appeal to the CAS.78 This, 
however, can result in inconsistent and potentially problematic results.79 These 
problems are compounded when one considers that the individual athlete must 
shoulder the unpredictability and costs that necessarily accompany a second 
proceeding at the CAS.80 Because of these issues, both WADA and the CAS 
can impact athletes in a significant manner.81 
                                                                                                                           
MISSIBILITY OF SPORTS LAW-RELATED MATTERS 1 (Feb. 2014), http://documents.lexology.
com/27b73a8a-9af9-4539-a0ce-d648e47e38e5.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2SC-3ZX7]. Appeals to the Swiss 
Supreme Court, however, are “allowed on a very limited number of grounds.” Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, supra note 8. 
 72 The Code, supra note 54; WADA’s Role in Results Management, supra note 65. 
 73 WADA’s Role in Results Management, supra note 65. 
 74 See Weston, supra note 9, at 5–6 (noting that athletes competing internationally “agree to man-
datory arbitration” at the CAS and that athletes are required to follow the anti-doping rules of the 
WADA Code). 
 75 Id. 
 76 See Reilly, supra note 30, at 70 (explaining that IFs are required “to adopt anti-doping rules 
which are in compliance with the WADA Code” and also binding on their athletes). 
 77 Melissa Hewitt, Note, An Unbalanced Act: A Criticism of How the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport Issues Unjustly Harsh Sanctions by Attempting to Regulate Doping in Sport, 22 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 769, 769 (2015). 
 78 Maureen A. Weston, Simply a Dress Rehearsal? U.S. Olympic Sports Arbitration and De Novo 
Review at the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 97, 101 (2009). 
 79 See id. at 102–03 (noting that such a process can result in further penalties and additional 
costs). Weston notes the disciplinary proceedings of Tyler Hamilton, in which the U.S. Anti-Doping 
Agency imposed a penalty of eight years. Id. at 101. WADA, not involved in the disciplinary proceed-
ing, however, elected to appeal the decision to CAS, asking CAS for a lifetime ban from the sport. Id. 
 80 Id. at 102. For example, cyclist Floyd Landis spent over $2 million related to a public arbitra-
tion and appeal to the CAS, in an effort to defend doping charges against him. Weston, supra note 9, 
at 9–10. 
 81 See Weston, supra note 78, at 102–03 (discussing consequences of “anti-doping” agencies, 
such as WADA, appealing to the CAS). 
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II. ISSUES FACED BY THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT  
AND THE NEED FOR REFORM 
This part discusses historical challenges and contemporary issues regard-
ing the CAS, as demonstrated by three doping-related cases.82 Section A pro-
vides a background of the early concerns directed at the CAS.83 Section B then 
summarizes a CAS decision, Gundel v. Fédération Equestre Internationale, 
which ultimately motivated reform at the CAS.84 Section C highlights a more 
recent CAS decision involving German speed-skater Claudia Pechstein.85 Fi-
nally, Section D discusses the recent supplement scandal involving Essendon 
of the AFL, in order to illustrate issues that still exist in the context of doping 
appeals to the CAS.86 
A. Historical Issues Faced by the CAS 
Since its establishment, the CAS has had to endure allegations that it was 
not an independent and impartial tribunal.87 For instance, in its early days, the 
CAS and the IOC were closely connected, as the IOC exerted substantial fi-
nancial control and played a significant role in the governance and composi-
tion of the CAS.88 
The arbitrator selection process exemplifies the influence the IOC pos-
sessed over the CAS.89 The composition of the arbitrator selection pool was 
done in the following manner: the IOC nominated fifteen persons, the Presi-
dent of the IOC nominated fifteen persons, the National Olympic Committees 
nominated fifteen persons, and the International Federation for Olympic sports 
nominated the final fifteen.90 Thus, the sixty arbitrators were all, either directly 
or indirectly, chosen by an Olympic organization.91 Perhaps more importantly, 
individual athletes did not have any immediate input in the procedure.92 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See infra notes 87–174 and accompanying text. 
 83 See infra notes 87–95 and accompanying text. 
 84 See infra notes 96–119 and accompanying text. 
 85 See infra notes 120–136 and accompanying text. 
 86 See infra notes 137–174 and accompanying text. 
 87 Downie, supra note 10, at 320–21. See generally History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
 88 See Downie, supra note 10, at 321 (noting that in its early years, the CAS was “financially and 
administratively dependent on the IOC” and that the IOC was tasked with appointing the CAS arbitra-
tors); History of the CAS, supra note 21 (noting that the IOC shouldered the entire operating costs of 
the CAS and that the CAS founding statute could only be amended with the consent of the IOC). 
 89 Daniel H. Yi, Turning Metals into Metal: Evaluating the Court of Arbitration for Sport as an 
International Tribunal, 6 ASPER. REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 289, 296–97 (2006). 
 90 Id. at 296–97. 
 91 Id. The CAS initially contained sixty arbitrators, although this figure was subsequently in-
creased. Id. at 296, 299. 
 92 Id. at 297. 
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Examples such as the arbitrator selection process cast doubt upon both the 
impartiality of the CAS arbitrators and the independence of the CAS.93 In fact, 
one commentator characterized the CAS as the “little sibling of the IOC.’’94 
These concerns over independence and impartiality plagued the integrity of the 
CAS and eventually were the catalyst for a series of major reforms to the insti-
tution.95 
B. Gundel v. Fédération Equestre Internationale:  
A Turning Point at the CAS 
1. Facts and Procedural History 
The need to reform the CAS to better ensure independence and impartiali-
ty was highlighted in the 1993 CAS decision of Gundel v. Fédération Equestre 
Internationale.96 The case involved a German equestrian rider, Elmar Gundel, 
accused of doping his horse in order to gain a competitive edge at a leading 
international competition.97 After Gundel’s horse tested positive for a banned 
substance, the International Equestrian Federation (“FEI”) fined Gundel and 
suspended him from competition for a period of three months.98 Disappointed 
with the FEI’s decision, Gundel appealed the penalty to the CAS, which ulti-
mately reduced his suspension to only one month.99 Despite this partial victory 
at the CAS, Gundel elected to appeal the CAS decision to the Swiss Supreme 
Court (“SFT”).100 Gundel’s theory on appeal to the SFT was that the CAS 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
 94 Downie, supra note 10, at 321 (quoting and citing Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Sports Market-
ing: Tax and Finance (paper presented at the IOC Museum, Lausanne, Switzerland, 1994)). 
 95 See id. at 321–22 (discussing the Gundel decision and the reforms that followed). 
 96 Id. at 320–21; History of the CAS, supra note 21. See G. v. Fédération Equestre Internationale, 
in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS 1986–1998, at 561 (Kluwer Law Int’l, Matthew Reeb ed., 1998) (providing 
discussion of background, legal grounds for appeal, and analysis). 
 97 Downie, supra note 10, at 321; Yi, supra note 89, at 297; History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
The competition, an “international jumping event,” took place in Aachen, Germany. G. v. Fédération 
Equestre Internationale, supra note 96, at 562. 
 98 Downie, supra note 10, at 321; Yi, supra note 89, at 297–98. The International Equestrian 
Federation is “the world governing body of equestrian sport” whose goal is to “ensure that [e]vents 
. . . are conducted in a fair, consistent and structured way across the globe.” My FEI Guide, FEI, 
http://inside.fei.org/myfeiguide [https://perma.cc/XYM8-Q4H4]. 
 99 Downie supra note 10, at 321; Yi, supra note 89, at 297–98; History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
The CAS’s decision to reduce the suspension from three months to one month was not based upon an 
unreliable or faulty drug test of the horse—the CAS noted that it was “irrefutable” that banned sub-
stances were inside the horse. Downie, supra note 10, at 321. Rather, the CAS based its decision to 
reduce the suspension on the fact that the “mere presence” of the illegal drugs did not establish that 
Gundel intended to cheat. Id. 
 100 Downie, supra note 10, at 321; Yi, supra note 89, at 297–98; History of the CAS, supra note 
21. As noted supra note 71, decisions of the CAS may be appealed to the Swiss Supreme Court, in 
accordance with “Article 190 of the Swiss Private International Law Act.” VALLONI & KELLER, supra 
note 71, at 1. 
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award was unenforceable because it was not an independent and impartial 
award under Swiss law.101 Despite Gundel’s efforts, the SFT upheld the CAS 
award, noting that the CAS was an independent arbitral tribunal.102 
Notwithstanding the SFT’s approval of the CAS and the award handed to 
Gundel, the SFT did focus attention on the relationship between the CAS and 
the IOC.103 In particular, the Swiss court found it troubling that the IOC was 
nearly entirely responsible for financing the CAS, that the IOC possessed the 
ability to change the CAS founding statute, and that the IOC wielded substan-
tial influence in the appointment of the CAS arbitrators.104 In light of these 
factors, the Swiss court, in dicta, expressed that it would be best if the CAS 
became more independent, both financially and structurally, from the IOC.105 
2. Post-Gundel Reforms at the CAS 
In the wake of Gundel, “[t]he Presidents of the IOC, Association of 
Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF), the Association of Inter-
national Winter Sports Federations (AIWF) and the Association of National 
Olympic Committees (ANOC)” implemented reforms in an attempt to make 
the CAS more independent and impartial as a tribunal.106 The chief reforms 
established a new organization to act as a buffer between the CAS and the 
IOC, enlarged the arbitrator selection pool, and diversified the funding of the 
CAS.107 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Downie, supra note 10, at 321; Yi, supra note 89, at 297–98; History of the CAS, supra note 
21. Gundel argued that “the CAS was essentially controlled by Olympic institutions.” Yi, supra note 
89, at 297. Article 190 of PILA sets out the grounds upon which an “award may . . . be annulled.” 
Federal Statute on Private International Law, SWISS CHAMBERS’ ARB. INSTITUTION, https://www.
swissarbitration.org/files/34/Swiss%20International%20Arbitration%20Law/IPRG_english.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/397J-47BR] (see Article 190(2)). Such grounds include “if the arbitral tribunal was 
not properly constituted” and “if the award is incompatible with public policy.” Id. (see Articles 
190(2)(a) and 190(2)(e)). 
 102 Downie, supra note 10, at 321; History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
 103 Downie, supra note 10, at 321; Yi, supra note 89, at 297–98; History of the CAS, supra note 
21. 
 104 Yi, supra note 89, at 297–98; History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
 105 Downie, supra note 10, at 321; Yi, supra note 89, at 298; History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
 106 Yi, supra note 89, at 298 n.61; see Downie, supra note 10, at 321–22 (describing reforms); His-
tory of the CAS, supra note 21 (same). In addition to the major reforms described above, the CAS period-
ically amends its Code of Sports-Related Arbitration. See generally, e.g., Antonio Rigozzi et al., The 
2011, 2012, and 2013 Revisions to the Code of Sports-related Arbitration, JUSLETTER, June 3, 2013, 
http://lk-k.com/wp-content/uploads/RIGOZZI-HASLER-QUINN-The-2011-2012-2013-Revisions-of-
the-CAS-Code-Jusletter-3-June-2013-Annex.pdf [https://perma.cc/739Q-RVKA] (describing recent 
changes in the CAS Code). For an example of the periodic revisions made to the Code of Sports-
Related Arbitration, see Amendments to the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT 
(Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Amendments_Code_2017_tracked_
changes.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L4Y-6NKH]. 
 107 Yi, supra note 89, at 298–99; see also Downie, supra note 10, at 321–22 (describing CAS 
reforms); History of the CAS, supra note 21 (same). 
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The first reform called for the creation of the International Council of Ar-
bitration for Sport (“ICAS”), which replaced the IOC in its role as the govern-
ing and financing body of the CAS.108 Responsibilities of ICAS, which was 
established in an effort to make the CAS more independent on the IOC, in-
clude overseeing the “administration and financing of the CAS,” as well as 
“appoint[ing] the CAS arbitrators.”109 The second reform expanded the number 
of arbitrators available for parties to select—from sixty to a minimum of 
150.110 The goal was to provide parties with greater diversity in their selections 
and ease the burden imposed by the CAS’s heavy caseload.111 Finally, the CAS 
would no longer receive nearly all of its funding from the IOC.112 Instead, in 
addition to receiving some funding from the IOC, the CAS would receive 
funding from other sources, such as private organizations and National Olym-
pic Committees.113 
Nevertheless, despite the aforementioned reform efforts, criticism sur-
rounding the CAS did not disappear entirely.114 For example, the independence 
of the CAS was once again attacked in a 2003 case involving two Russian 
Olympic skiers who were disqualified by the CAS from the Winter Olympic 
Games in Salt Lake City.115 The two skiers appealed the CAS ruling to the 
SFT, which had to decide whether the CAS, in light of the previous reforms 
made, was sufficiently independent.116 The Swiss court ultimately upheld the 
CAS ruling, and unlike in Gundel, the court found the CAS and the IOC “suf-
ficiently independent” of each other and the CAS a cornerstone of the sports 
world.117 Notwithstanding the Swiss court’s observance that the IOC and CAS 
were separate bodies, two recent cases have attracted further criticism of the 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Downie, supra note 10, at 321–22; Yi, supra note 89, at 298; History of the CAS, supra note 
21. ICAS is a governing body of twenty “experienced jurists,” each “appointed for one or several 
renewable [term] period(s) of four years.” Code: Statutes of ICAS and CAS, supra note 37. 
 109 History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
 110 Yi, supra note 89, at 299. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See History of the CAS, supra note 21; see also Essendon 34: Further Consideration of the CAS 
Decision, SNEDDEN HALL & GALLOP (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.shglawyers.com.au/news/legal-
news/article/?id=essendon-34-further-consideration-of-the-cas-decision [https://perma.cc/HJA4-ZGD5]; 
Mathias Wittinghofer & Sylvia Schenk, A Never Ending Story: Claudia Pechstein’s Challenge to the 
CAS, WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER ARB. BLOG (June 14, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/
2016/06/14/a-never-ending-story-claudia-pechsteins-challenge-to-the-cas/ [https://perma.cc/AE8B-
DMEA] (describing German speed-skater Claudia Pechstein’s challenge to the CAS in the German 
courts). 
 115 History of the CAS, supra note 21; see Lazutina Loses Olympic Medals, BBC (June 29, 2003), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/other_sports/3015952.stm (noting that the two Russian skiers’ “two-
year bans for doping offences” were affirmed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal). 
 116 See History of the CAS, supra note 21. 
 117 Id. 
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CAS.118 In particular, such cases have brought to light the need for a fair bal-
ance of power between athletes and sport organizations at the CAS.119 
C. Pechstein v. International Skating Union: Another Challenge to CAS 
Independence and Impartiality 
The CAS ruling against German speed-skater Claudia Pechstein, and her 
subsequent appeal, highlighted issues that had troubled the CAS in Gundel.120 
Claudia Pechstein began her international speed-skating career in 1988 and 
since then, had competed in five Olympic Games.121 During her career, Pech-
stein captured many world, European and national titles, in addition to earning 
five gold medals and two bronze medals at the Olympics.122 Pechstein’s legal 
battle chiefly emphasized the potential structural bias as well as the imbal-
anced arbitrator selection rules athletes must face in arbitration proceedings 
before the CAS.123 
Pechstein’s legal battle began in 2009, when the International Skating Un-
ion (“ISU”) charged Pechstein with blood doping and banned her from com-
                                                                                                                           
 118 See generally Essendon CAS Verdict: Timeline of Events in the Supplements Saga, THE AGE 
(Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.theage.com.au/afl/essendon-cas-verdict-timeline-of-events-in-the-
supplements-saga-20160107-gm0z20.html [https://perma.cc/JX9Z-6BLM] (providing an overview of 
the events of the Essendon “supplements saga”); Wittinghofer & Schenk, supra note 114 (summariz-
ing speed-skater Claudia Pechstein’s legal journey). 
 119 See The Essendon 34: A New Perspective, SNEDDEN HALL & GALLOP (Jan. 15, 2016), https://
www.shglawyers.com.au/news/legal-news/article/?id=the-essendon-34-a-new-perspective [https://
perma.cc/NZH7-XEE3] (noting issues relating to “the compatibility between the forced nature of the 
CAS arbitration on the one hand and the rights of the players to a fair decision on the other”); Rosanna 
Ryan, What’s Wrong with WADA and the Court of Arbitration for Sport?, ABC: RN BREAKFAST 
(Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/breakfast/whats-wrong-with-wada-and-
the-court-of-arbitration-for-sport/7081534 [https://perma.cc/CDB8-MJN2] (discussing the imbalance 
of power between athletes and sports organizations); Matt Slater, Claudia Pechstein Puts Sport’s 
Supreme Court on Trial, BBC: SPORT (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/sport/31447368 [https://
perma.cc/D3SX-ABX2] (noting the need for the “independence and transparency” in relation to sports 
“arbitration agreements”). 
 120 See Rebecca R. Ruiz, Sports Arbitration Court Ruling Against German Speedskater Claudia 
Pechstein Is Upheld, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/sports/sports-
arbitration-court-ruling-against-german-speedskater-claudia-pechstein-is-upheld.html [https://perma.
cc/GR2K-XDZ7] (noting issues raised in Claudia Pechstein’s case); G. v. Fédération Equestre Interna-
tionale, supra note 96, at 561 (questioning the independence of the CAS); Wittinghofer & Schenk, 
supra note 114 (same). 
 121 Pechstein v. Int’l Skating Union, CAS 2009/A/1912, ¶ 1 (Court of Arbitration for Sport, Nov. 
25, 2009), https://www.isu.org/claudia-pechstein-case/2198-arbitral-award-cas/file [https://perma.cc/
NLH2-U5GX]. Pechstein had competed in five Olympic Games at the time of the CAS ruling. Id. 
 122 Id. In total, Pechstein has won over sixty medals while competing internationally since 1992. 
Wittinghofer & Schenk, supra note 114. 
 123 See Peter Charlish, The Biological Passport: Closing the Net on Doping, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. 
REV. 61, 82 (2011) (noting that Pechstein’s appeal to the SFT related to the “independence” of the 
CAS); Amanda Coletta, Speedskater Is Poised to Upend Rule of Sports’ Highest Court, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/sports/skater-challenges-supremacy-of-court-
of-arbitration-for-sport.html [https://perma.cc/9WKF-YKDX] (discussing arbitrator selection bias). 
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peting for two years.124 Pechstein challenged the ISU decision at the CAS, ar-
guing that the blood testing procedure employed by the ISU was flawed.125 In 
addition, Pechstein pointed to the fact that she had never been the subject of a 
positive blood doping test at any point in her skating career.126 Despite Pech-
stein’s arguments, the CAS affirmed the ISU finding her guilty of blood dop-
ing and upheld the two-year competition ban.127 
In December 2009, Pechstein appealed the CAS decision to the SFT.128 In 
her appeal, Pechstein requested the court set aside the CAS award, which af-
firmed her two-year ban.129 Pechstein disputed the independence of the CAS, 
alleging that the IOC felt pressure to appear effective in its doping enforcement 
efforts, and that this pressure may have influenced the CAS decision.130 The 
SFT flatly rejected her appeal, however, pointing out that Pechstein had failed 
to raise the issue of independence at the CAS proceeding.131 
Although the SFT is the ultimate appellate tribunal for parties disputing 
CAS awards, Pechstein was nevertheless determined to continue her legal sa-
ga, choosing to take her case to the Munich Appeal Court.132 Significantly, the 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See Charlish, supra note 123, at 72 (noting that after the ISU charged Pechstein with blood 
doping, “the ISU Disciplinary Committee subsequently imposed a two-year ban on [her]”). See gen-
erally Pechstein (issuing the CAS arbitration award). “The International Skating Union [ISU] . . . is an 
association formed under the laws of Switzerland and having its seat in Lausanne, [Switzerland].” Id. 
¶ 3. In addition, “[t]he ISU is recognized by the [IOC] as the international federation governing the 
sports of figure skating and speed skating worldwide.” Id. Moreover, the ISU is a signatory to the 
WADA Code and thus its anti-doping program “fully follows the World Anti-Doping Agency (WA-
DA) Code.” Clean Sport, INT’L SKATING UNION, https://www.isu.org/anti-doping [https://perma.cc/
K2ZC-46GN]; Code Signatories, supra note 49. The ISU accused Pechstein of violating Article 2.2 of 
the ISU Anti-Doping Rules, which is consistent with WADA’s Anti-Doping Code. Pechstein, CAS 
2009/A/1912 ¶ 12; Charlish, supra note 123, at 72. 
 125 See Charlish, supra note 123, at 72–73 (setting out Pechstein’s arguments against the ISU 
decision). The metrics employed by the ISU to assess the blood test results include, but are not limited 
to, “hemoglobin, hematocrit and percentage of reticulocytes.” Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 ¶ 7. The 
ISU found that Pechstein’s percentage of reticulocytes, which are “immature red blood cells that are 
released from the bone marrow,” were “abnormal,” as the percentages were “well above” the normal 
range, and then decreased dramatically. Id. ¶¶ 7, 8, 10. In addition to questioning the validity of the 
blood testing, Pechstein asserted that a “chronic blood disorder and/or genetic abnormality” could 
explain her increased levels of reticulocytes. Id. ¶ 52. 
 126 Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 ¶ 46; Charlish, supra note 123, at 72. 
 127 Pechstein, CAS 2009/A/1912 ¶¶ 212–215; Charlish, supra note 123, at 81. 
 128 Nathalie Voser & Philipp Meier, Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Reasoning in the “Pechstein” Case 
Confirms Its Strict Approach to Petitions to Set Aside Arbitral Awards, THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTI-
CAL LAW (June 2, 2010), http://uk.practicallaw.com/5-502-4343# [https://perma.cc/4QET-P95E]. 
 129 Id. In addition to the appeal described above, Pechstein unsuccessfully challenged the ruling a 
second time at the SFT. Andrew Smith, The Pechstein Judgment: CAS’s Reaction & Potential Ramifi-
cations, LAW IN SPORT (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.lawinsport.com/articles/item/the-pechstein-
judgment-cas-s-reaction-potential-ramifications [https://perma.cc/E2SN-RXA9]. 
 130 See Charlish, supra note 123, at 82. 
 131 Id. at 84–85. 
 132 Karolos Grohmann, German Skater Pechstein Earns Key Court Win over ISU, REUTERS (Jan. 
15, 2015, 5:28 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-doping-skating-pechstetin-idUSKBN0KO
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Munich Appeal Court found the arbitration clause between Pechstein and the 
ISU to be invalid as a violation of German competition law.133 In addition, the 
Munich appellate court stated that the CAS decision was invalid and that it 
would not recognize the decision.134 The court reasoned that the arbitration 
agreement between the ISU and Pechsetein was contrary to German law and 
thus against public policy, and so, pursuant to the New York Convention, the 
court decided not to recognize the award.135 
                                                                                                                           
0X220150115 [https://perma.cc/N5QF-Z9AB]. At the Munich appellate court, Pechstein sought 4.4 
million euros from the ISU for lost wages as a result of the suspension. Coletta, supra note 123. Pech-
stein was able to reach the Munich appellate court after first disputing the CAS award in the Regional 
Court of Munich. Wittinghofer & Schenk, supra note 114. The Munich appellate court, or the Higher 
Regional Court, “hear[s] appeals against judgements of the regional courts.” Ordinary Courts—
Germany, EUR. E-JUST. PORTAL, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_ordinary_courts-18-de-maximize
MS-en.do?member=1 [https://perma.cc/7YBR-6XJH] (last updated Sept. 9, 2016). In general, an 
“award” refers to “[a] final judgment or decision, esp. one by an arbitrator or by a jury assessing dam-
ages.” Award, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 133 Smith, supra note 129. It should be noted that in February 2014, the Landgericht München I 
(Munich District Court), like the Munich appellate court, found that the arbitration agreement between 
Pechstein and the ISU was not valid. Id. Nevertheless, the Munich District Court believed itself to be 
bound by the CAS decision, finding that the issues were barred by res judicata. Witinghofer & 
Schenk, supra note 114. The Munich appellate court did not find a “dominant sport organization” 
conditioning athlete participation in international sport events on the signing of an arbitration agree-
ment to be per se invalid. Id. The court, however, did find that the agreement between Pechstein and 
the ISU was invalid. Id. In finding the agreement invalid, the court noted that “[t]he ISU is a monopo-
list on the market for the access to Speed-Skating World Championships and therefore in a dominant 
position” and that “the fact that ISU required . . . Pechstein to sign an arbitration agreement in favour 
of [the] CAS is an abuse of dominant position.” Oberlandesgericht München [OLG of Munich] Jan. 
15, 2015, Az. U 1110/14 Kart, ¶¶ 76, 93 (Ger.), translated in Antoine Duval, Translation of the Pech-
stein Ruling of the OLG München, https://goo.gl/9uR7H2 [https://perma.cc/KE8G-8HKB] [hereinafter 
Translation of the Pechstein Ruling]. 
 134 Grohman, supra note 132. The Munich court commented in detail on the composition of the 
ICAS, the selection of CAS arbitrators, and the imbalance of power between athletes and sport associ-
ations. See generally Translation of the Pechstein Ruling, supra note 133 (translating the ruling of the 
Munich appellate court). For example, the court was of the opinion that the “provisions regulating the 
selection of the potential CAS arbitrators favour the sports associations in disputes against athletes . . . 
embedding a structural imbalance that is threatening the neutrality of [the] CAS” and that “[t]here is 
no rational justification for such an imbalance in favour of the sports associations.” Translation of the 
Pechstein Ruling, supra note 133, ¶¶ 104, 109. 
 135 Danielle Sharkey et al., Skating on Thin Ice: The Independence of CAS Challenged, DLA 
PIPER: MEDIA, SPORT & ENT. ONLINE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://blogs.dlapiper.com/mediaandsport/2015/
03/skating-on-thin-ice-the-independence-of-cas-is-challenged-2/ [https://perma.cc/RQR6-W2GE]. 
The New York Convention (officially The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards), allows for the “recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,” which 
requires that contracting States “recognize . . . [arbitral] awards as binding and to enforce them.” In 
Brief, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/in+brief [https://perma.cc/AL7J-
WEG9]. In Pechstein’s case, the Munich appellate court concluded that the CAS award “[could not] 
be recognized due to § 1061 Abs. 1 Satz 1 ZPO in relation with [Art. V(2)(b)] of the New York Con-
vention.” Translation of the Pechstein Ruling, supra note 133, ¶ 131. Article V(2)(b) provides: “2. 
Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in 
the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: . . . (b) The recognition or en-
forcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.” See U.N. Convention 
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Although the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of Justice), the top 
civil court in the nation, would later rule against Pechstein and affirm the legiti-
macy of the CAS as an independent arbitral body, Pechstein’s legal journey 
through the courts brought to light the inadequacies that persisted at the CAS.136 
D. The Essendon Supplement Scandal: Highlighting the Potential 
Inconsistency Between First-Instance Tribunals and the CAS 
1. Facts and Procedural History 
In addition to the charges of institutional bias and lack of independence 
exposed in the Pechstein legal saga, appeals adjudicated by the CAS can lead 
to inconsistencies between the CAS and the relevant domestic authority.137 The 
standard of review employed by the CAS Appeals Division is partly to blame 
for such varied results.138 This de novo standard of review allows the CAS Ap-
peals Division to re-examine the factual record as if doing so in the first in-
stance.139 This ability, coupled with the fact that the awards by the CAS Ap-
peals Division are considered “final and binding,” can have adverse effects on 
athletes.140 The recent case involving Essendon of the AFL has illustrated the 
conflicting results of the CAS and the domestic disciplinary body.141 The con-
                                                                                                                           
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (June 7, 1958), http://www.uncitral.
org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-York-Convention-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/ADV9-
RCZ8] (see Article V(2)). 
 136 See Wittinghofer & Schenk, supra note 114. 
 137 See Coletta, supra note 123; Ryan, supra note 119. 
 138 See Weston, supra note 78, at 113. 
 139 See id. De novo judicial review refers to “[a] court’s review of a lower court’s or an adminis-
trative body’s factual or legal findings.” See Judicial Review, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). For example, in Pechstein, the CAS characterized this de novo review as imposing the duty on 
the arbitration panel to “make [an] independent determination as to whether the parties’ contentions 
are inherently correct rather than to assess the correctness of the Appealed Decision.” Pechstein, CAS 
2009/A/1912 ¶ 77. The panel in Pechstein also made clear that such de novo review would require the 
panel “not [to be] confined to deciding whether the body that issued the appealed ruling was correct or 
not.” Id.; see also World Anti-Doping Agency v. Bellchambers., CAS 2015/A/4059, ¶ 114 (Ct. Arb. 
Sport, Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Arbitral_Award_WADA_
ESSENDON.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9SX-U9RQ] (rejecting Essendon players’ contention that appeal 
should be not be de novo). De novo review may be contrasted with abuse of discretion, which is the 
typical appellate review standard. See Weston, supra note 78, at 111 n.70. 
 140 See Weston, supra note 78, at 113–14. 
 141 See, e.g., Grant Baker, Essendon Chairman Lindsay Tanner Says It’s ‘Unlikely’ Banned 
Bombers Will Be Back on the Park This Season, HERALD SUN (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.
heraldsun.com.au/sport/afl/more-news/essendon-chairman-lindsay-tanner-says-its-unlikely-banned-
bombers-will-be-back-on-the-park-this-season/news-story/06dc142ed1dff5ef00acb3316012baa1 
[https://perma.cc/NNX9-2B5W?type=image]; Stephanie Chalkley-Rhoden, Essendon ASADA Investi-
gation: Players Not Guilty of Using Banned Peptide, AFL Anti-Doping Tribunal Finds, ABC NEWS 
(Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-03-31/essendon-supplements-afl-anti-doping-
tribunal-decision/6361006 [https://perma.cc/U4JE-5UE8]. Australian football is a contact sport that is 
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troversy resulted in the twelve-month suspension of thirty-four Essendon play-
ers.142 
The heart of the dispute centered on Essendon’s supplement program.143 
The program, designed and managed by the club’s sport scientist, consisted of 
administering subcutaneous injections and pills to the players to stimulate soft 
tissue recovery time, thereby giving the players a physical advantage over their 
competition.144 During the course of the supplement program, the club’s sport 
scientist, as well as the club’s head coach and performance coach, held a meet-
ing with the players, after which the players signed forms consenting to the 
injections of certain drugs.145 Moreover, the consent forms stated that the in-
jected substances were compliant with WADA.146 Although some players, as 
well as the team doctor, expressed their concerns about the program, the sup-
plements continued to be given out to the players.147 
On February 5, 2013, Essendon decided to report itself to the AFL and to 
the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (“ASADA”), exposing the per-
formance enhancing sports supplement program that Essendon was administer-
ing to its athletes.148 In August 2013, the AFL brought charges against Essen-
                                                                                                                           
similar to rugby but is described as “uniquely Australian.” Introduction to Australian Football, U.S. 
AUSTL. FOOTBALL LEAGUE, https://usafl.com/intro#what [https://perma.cc/JAA5-4JV3]. 
 142 Essendon Supplement Saga: Players Banned for 12 Months After WADA Appeal Upheld by 
Court of Arbitration for Sport, ABC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-01-
12/cas-upholds-wada-appeal-essendon-anti-doping-verdict/7081874 [https://perma.cc/RN3R-P9F4]. 
The suspension was two years; however, WADA gave “credit . . . for any individual period of ineligi-
bility already served.” Media Release, Ct. Arb. Sport, WADA Appeal Against 34 Current and Former 
Players of Essendon Football Club Upheld; Violation of Anti-Doping Rules Established; Players Sus-
pended (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Media_Release_4059.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MQ7G-Z6R8]. 
 143 See Carly Crawford, Essendon Drugs Saga: How Stephen Dank Ran the Controversial Sup-
plement Program, HERALD SUN (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.heraldsun.com.au/sport/afl/teams/
essendon/essendon-drugs-saga-how-stephen-dank-ran-the-controversial-supplement-program/news-
story/ea77b17dfe9d7f67d8d0cac79f4f9aa5 [https://perma.cc/7JER-V3A6?type=image]. 
 144 See id.; see also Bellchambers, CAS 2015/A/4059 ¶ 25 (mentioning the team doctor’s unease 
over “players being given subcutaneous injections”). 
 145 Bellchambers, CAS 2015/A/4059 ¶ 27; Crawford, supra note 143. The “‘patient infor-
mation/informed consent’ forms” were signed by the players “either at the meeting or shortly thereaf-
ter.” Bellchambers, CAS 2015/A/4059 ¶ 27. 
 146 Bellchambers, CAS 2015/A/4059 ¶ 27. 
 147 Id. ¶¶ 24, 25. For example, Essendon’s team doctor expressed his unease about the program to 
the head coach and the performance coach, writing that “we are playing at the edge and this will read 
extremely bad in the press for our club and for the benefits and also for side effects that are not known 
in the long term. I have trouble with all these drugs.” Id. ¶ 25. 
 148 Essendon CAS Verdict: Timeline of Events in the Supplements Saga, THE AGE (Jan. 12, 2016), 
http://www.theage.com.au/afl/essendon-cas-verdict-timeline-of-events-in-the-supplements-saga-
20160107-gm0z20.html [https://perma.cc/8DS6-KXF3]. ASADA is the “national anti-doping organisa-
tion” of Australia. About, AUSTL. SPORTS ANTI-DOPING AUTHORITY, https://www.asada.gov.au/about-
asada [https://perma.cc/XF8K-U58V]. The purpose of ASADA is to “protect the health of athletes and 
the integrity of . . . sport through engagement, deterrence, detection and enforcement.” Id. Moreover, 
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don and certain Essendon personnel in connection with the supplement pro-
gram.149 The AFL subsequently implemented various penalties against the club 
and staff, including barring the club from playing in the league championship, 
a loss of future draft picks, and a two million dollar fine.150 
This self-reporting prompted ASADA to begin its own investigation of 
the supplement program, which commenced in February 2013.151 In November 
2014, ASADA issued “infraction notices” to the players, alleging use of pro-
hibited substances, which violated the AFL Anti-Doping Code.152 The case 
against the Essendon players, however, was based on circumstantial evidence; 
there was no direct evidence that each of the Essendon players injected the 
prohibited substances.153 Later, in March 2015, an AFL Anti-Doping Tribunal 
found that the thirty-four Essendon athletes were not guilty of using banned 
substances.154 
Despite Essendon’s victory at the AFL tribunal, the club’s legal issues 
were far from over.155 In August 2015, WADA announced that it would appeal 
the AFL tribunal’s exculpation of the Essendon players to the CAS.156 WADA’s 
appeal at the CAS commenced in November 2015, and in January 2016, the 
CAS ruled that the AFL tribunal’s findings were to be vacated and the players 
suspended for the 2016 season.157 Essendon then appealed the CAS verdict to 
                                                                                                                           
ASADA works closely with WADA in an attempt to “strengthen anti-doping practices globally”; 
ASADA’s efforts are in line with the WADA Code. Id. 
 149 Essendon CAS Verdict, supra note 148. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Bellchambers, CAS 2015/A/4059 ¶ 32. 
 152 Id.; James Kitching, Not Comfortably Satisfied? The Upcoming Court of Arbitration for Sport 
Case of the Thirty-Four Current and Former Players of the Essendon Football Club., ASSER INT’L 
SPORTS L. BLOG (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.asser.nl/SportsLaw/Blog/post/not-comfortably-satisfied-
the-upcoming-court-of-arbitration-for-sport-case-of-the-thirty-four-current-and-former-players-of-the-
essendon-football-club-by-james-kitching [https://perma.cc/DCY4-T5XE]. The AFL Anti-Doping 
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 153 See Dan Trindade & Ruth Thevathasan, Evidence, the Essendon 34, and the Employee Under 
Suspicion, CLAYTON UTZ (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.claytonutz.com/knowledge/2016/april/
evidence-the-essendon-34-and-the-employee-under-suspicion [https://perma.cc/M5HE-9QDF] (noting 
that the CAS was “[p]resented with a raft of circumstantial evidence” and that “the case against the 
Essendon 34 [was developed] without a smoking syringe”). 
 154 Chalkley-Rhoden, supra note 141. 
 155 See, e.g., World Anti-Doping Tribunal to Appeal AFL Anti-Doping Tribunal’s Essendon Ver-
dict, ABC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-12/wada-to-appeal-afl-anti-
doping-tribunal27s-essendon-verdict/6461996 [https://perma.cc/MNY8-87X2] (noting WADA’s deci-
sion to appeal Essendon’s case to the CAS). 
 156 Id. 
 157 Essendon CAS Verdict, supra note 148; see Masters, supra note 11 (describing the CAS deci-
sion against Essendon). The CAS decision was met with mixed reactions; although some claimed the 
CAS decision was best for the future of the sport and would discourage supplement abuse, others 
believed the Essendon players were “victims” and had committed no wrongdoing. See Shane de Barra, 
AFL Players’ Association Unloads on the CAS in Essendon Saga, SPORTING NEWS (Jan. 11, 2016), 
http://www.sportingnews.com/au/afl/news/afl-players-association-unloads-on-the-cas-in-essendon-
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the SFT, arguing that the CAS should not have employed a de novo standard in 
reviewing the AFL tribunal’s finding of not guilty.158 Rather, Essendon argued, 
the CAS should only have assessed whether the AFL tribunal committed an 
error of law.159 The SFT dismissed Essendon’s appeal, marking the end of the 
club’s legal fight.160 
2. Aftermath 
Essendon’s misfortunes at the CAS have generated a new wave of criti-
cism directed at the CAS and the World Anti-Doping Agency.161 One criticism 
of the CAS and WADA claims that athletes, such as the Essendon football 
players, are not party to any genuine agreement with the CAS or WADA.162 
Thus, this criticism likens the Essendon decision to the Pechstein decision.163 
Moreover, such critics contend that global governing bodies, such as the CAS 
and WADA, attempt to execute global policies that interfere with the ability of 
national sport bodies to implement their own specific policies.164 In short, the 
“one size fits all” model advanced by WADA and CAS is not the most effec-
tive way to forward individual athlete interests.165 A more focused model—one 
that is geographically narrower in scope—would be more flexible and respon-
sive to athlete needs.166 
Other criticisms focus on the differing theories employed at the AFL Anti-
Doping Tribunal and at the CAS, which led to profoundly different results us-
                                                                                                                           
saga/1n8glaz3e16gh1bw488qw5icr5 [https://perma.cc/Q9V6-XTTB] (noting different reactions to the 
CAS decision); Craig Fry, Court of Arbitration Decision on Essendon Doping Was the Right One, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.smh.com.au/comment/court-of-arbitration-
decision-on-essendon-doping-was-the-right-one-20160112-gm4ls3.html [https://perma.cc/S2FA-
CVRY] (reasoning that the CAS decision was correct). 
 158 See Baker, supra note 141. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Essendon Players Lose Swiss Court Appeal over Supplement Bans; Jobe Watson Could Lose 
2012 Brownlow, ABC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-11/afl-doping-
bans-over-essendon-supplements-court-appeal-fails/7923934 [https://perma.cc/R3CE-PZ5G]. 
 161 See, e.g., A Critique of the Essendon CAS Verdict (Part 1), THE ROAR (Jan. 17, 2016), http://
www.theroar.com.au/2016/01/17/a-critique-of-the-essendon-cas-verdict-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/
M3FF-CSE7] (contrasting the AFL tribunal and the CAS judgments); Darren Kane, Essendon CAS 
Verdict: Why Decision to Reverse AFL Tribunal’s Bombers Decision Was Mystifying, SYDNEY SUN-
DAY MORNING HERALD (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.smh.com.au/sport/essendon-cas-verdict-why-the-
decision-to-reverse-afl-tribunals-bombers-decision-was-mystifying-20160115-gm6lyh.html [https://
perma.cc/9D62-QFFK] (describing the CAS decision as “unanticipated”). 
 162 Ryan, supra note 119. 
 163 See id. (discussing both Claudia Pechstein’s and Essendon’s respective cases). 
 164 See id. (noting that sports lawyer Brendan Schwab reasons that such global policies clash with 
“sport at the national level”). 
 165 Id. 
 166 See id. (noting the issues with a global anti-doping procedure as well as the benefits of a more 
athlete-responsive method). 
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ing largely the same evidence.167 More precisely, the AFL Anti-Doping Tribu-
nal adopted a “links in the chain” evidentiary approach, while the CAS used a 
“strands in a cable” approach.168 The “links in the chain” approach requires the 
case to be proven sequentially—if one fact in the sequence is not proven, the 
chain falls apart and the case cannot be proven.169 In contrast, the “strands in a 
cable” approach simply looks at the totality of the circumstances, and general-
ly makes it easier to prove the issue in question.170 The use of two competing 
approaches in the same case has left some wondering what the appropriate 
standard in anti-doping proceedings should be.171 That completely opposite 
conclusions were reached on largely the same evidence drew significant skep-
ticism.172 
In summary, the Essendon supplement scandal illustrates that, in the con-
text of doping appeals, results at the CAS can clash with the decision of a do-
mestic tribunal.173 In particular, the opposite results of the AFL Anti-Doping 
Tribunal and the CAS in Essendon highlight the need for reform.174 
III. POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO THE ISSUES CONTAINED IN ESSENDON 
Although the CAS and WADA have worthy goals, and are designed to 
foster efficiency, tension nevertheless exists between athletes and sport organi-
                                                                                                                           
 167 A Critique of the Essendon CAS Verdict (Part 1), supra note 161; Kane, supra note 161. 
 168 Natalie Hickey, ASADA Said ‘Links in a Chain’; WADA Said ‘Strands in a Cable’: Which 
Was Right?, SOC. LITIGATOR (Jan. 14, 2016), https://sociallitigator.com/2016/01/14/asada-said-links-
in-a-chain-wada-said-strands-in-a-cable-which-was-right/ [https://perma.cc/6DL2-YADA]; Gareth 
Towan, The Essendon Decision: How a Different Decision Emerged from the Same Evidence, BRIS-
BANE TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/comment/the-essendon-decision-how-
could-a-different-decision-emerge-from-the-same-evidence-20160113-gm4q4w.html 
[https://perma.cc/WSH2-DWYZ]. 
 169 See Bellchambers, CAS 2015/A/4059 ¶ 109 (discussing “links in a chain” approach); Hickey, 
supra note 168 (same); Towan, supra note 168 (same). The AFL Anti-Doping Tribunal found that the 
links in the chain included: that the illegal substance (TB4) was obtained from China, that the illegal 
substance was then possessed by the club’s sports scientist, and that the sports scientist then injected 
the illegal substance to each accused player. Hickey, supra note 168. Because the AFL Anti-Doping 
Tribunal was not persuaded that each link was proven, ASADA lost the case. Id. 
 170 See Hickey, supra note 168; Towan, supra note 168 (discussing the “strands in a cable” meth-
od and noting that it “is easier to apply”). 
 171 See A Critique of the Essendon CAS Verdict (Part 1), supra note 161 (asking what the proper 
“burden of proof” should be). 
 172 See id. (questioning the evidentiary method employed at the CAS); see also Courtney Walsh, 
Essendon Doping Scandal: Reaction to CAS Verdict, THE AUSTRALIAN (Jan. 12, 2016, 12:18 PM), 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/sport/afl/essendon-doping-scandal-reaction-to-cas-verdict/news-
story/30ec9fe4cecc6551990029a66369cd1f [https://perma.cc/X2GG-7NG3] (noting the mixed reac-
tions to the CAS verdict). 
 173 See Essendon CAS Verdict, supra note 148 (providing a “timeline of events in the [Essendon] 
supplements saga”). 
 174 See Kane, supra note 161 (discussing the reversal of the AFL anti-doping tribunal’s decision 
by the CAS); Ryan, supra note 162 (noting some of the criticisms of the CAS). 
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zations, especially in doping appeals at the CAS.175 More specifically, the Es-
sendon and Pechstein cases highlight the tension between an individual ath-
lete’s right to a fair hearing and the governing sport body’s interest in effec-
tively prosecuting any offending athlete.176 To minimize this tension, changes 
should be made at the CAS, specifically in dealing with doping appeals.177 In 
arriving at this conclusion, the advantages and disadvantages of employing the 
current de novo standard at the CAS are explored, and the motivations for a 
more regional, or sport-specific anti-doping framework, which would allow for 
greater athlete input, are assessed.178 Driven by the concerns and rationale un-
derlying this framework, specific amendments to the CAS Code are recom-
mended to protect individual athletes’ rights.179 Section A argues for the usage 
of a more deferential standard of review in doping appeals at the CAS.180 Sec-
tion B argues that a more regionalized and tailored anti-doping enforcement 
method should be embraced.181 Finally, Section C suggests specific changes to 
the CAS Code to accomplish these objectives.182 
A. De Novo Review at the CAS in WADA Appeals 
The power and authority entrusted in the CAS does have certain ad-
vantages.183 One advantage is that a supra-national body like the CAS can 
more effectively and efficiently handle international sport disputes compared 
to a national court, due to the global applicability of the CAS Code.184 Moreo-
ver, the specialization of the CAS is an advantage as it is unlikely that a do-
mestic court would possess the comparable level of expertise in hearing sport 
                                                                                                                           
 175 See, e.g., Who We Are, supra note 50 (noting WADA’s “[c]ore [v]alues” and “[v]ision” of “[a] 
world where all athletes can compete in a doping-free sporting environment”); History of the CAS, 
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 180 See infra notes 183–199 and accompanying text. 
 181 See infra notes 200–215 and accompanying text. 
 182 See infra notes 216–232 and accompanying text. 
 183 Hewitt, supra note 77, at 777. 
 184 See id. at 777–78 (reasoning that “domestic courts” would settle such disputes in an inade-
quate manner and noting the “conflicting laws across jurisdictions”). 
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disputes; indeed, one of the reasons for the establishment of the CAS was the 
need for a specialized sports tribunal.185 
Some commentators, however, dispute the supposed advantages of the 
CAS.186 One supposed advantage of CAS power is that it promotes state sov-
ereignty, due to the fact that states consent to be bound to CAS authority but 
can revoke consent at any time.187 Critics dispute this point, however, claiming 
that CAS authority undermines state sovereignty due to the absence of an 
oversight body holding the CAS accountable.188 Moreover, the idea that con-
sent to CAS jurisdiction is voluntary and freely revocable is questionable, as 
experts point out that failure to consent can have dire consequences.189 
In the context of appeals to the CAS, de novo review is viewed favorably 
in light of the unease over the possibility that a domestic tribunal may act 
sympathetically or be unduly forgiving when faced with the prospect of pun-
ishing an athlete from its own jurisdiction.190 A de novo standard of review 
gives the CAS significant power over athletes as well as first instance tribu-
nals.191 Furthermore, a de novo standard of review can be advantageous, 
providing an appellate safety net from an unjust decision made by the first in-
stance tribunal.192 
Despite these advantages, a de novo standard in doping appeals at the 
CAS can prove to be costly, as it may in some instances cause the process and 
outcome of the lower court decision to be valueless.193 For example, following 
the CAS judgment against Essendon, the club reported it had lost AUD $9.8 
million, most of which was related to the CAS arbitration.194 
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COMMENTARY, CASES, AND MATERIALS 510–11 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2015) (commenting on the “heal-
ing effect” of de novo review). 
 193 Weston, supra note 78, at 113–14. 
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(Nov. 15, 2016), http://www.heraldsun.com.au/sport/afl/teams/essendon/essendon-announces-98-
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Thus, these perceived advantages are outweighed by the uncertainty and 
costs imposed; instead, a more deferential standard of review should be adopt-
ed in anti-doping appeals.195 Such a standard should limit grounds for appeal, 
making only significant errors of law or fact by the first-instance tribunal sub-
ject to review.196 Thus, by removing the possibility of conducting a full-blown 
trial at the appellate level, a more deferential standard of review would intro-
duce more significance to the proceedings at the first-instance tribunal.197 In 
turn, by according more deference to decisions of first-instance tribunals, such 
decisions could be of higher quality and the unpredictability inherent in de no-
vo reviews minimized.198 Moreover, another advantage of a more deferential 
standard of review at the CAS in doping appeals is that the legal process could 
be more predictable, thus reducing the time and expense burden imposed on 
both parties.199 
B. A Customized Approach to Anti-Doping Enforcement, Granting More 
Bargaining Power to Athletes 
In addition to increasing certainty and decreasing costs of anti-doping ap-
peals, a more deferential standard of review would necessarily give more pow-
er to the first instance tribunal; by vesting more power in the first instance tri-
bunal, anti-doping oversight is brought closer to the athletes.200 By adopting a 
more regional approach to anti-doping and taking into account whether the 
particular sport is team-oriented, WADA can ensure that its core principles are 
respected, while tailoring an approach capable of addressing the specific issues 
in a particular region or sport.201 
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 199 See Weston, supra note 78, at 113–14 (noting the time costs and monetary costs that may 
accompany de novo review at the CAS). 
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One example of such a varied and tailored solution to a particular doping 
epidemic is the reform instituted by Major League Baseball (MLB) in the 
wake of what is known as baseball’s “Steroid Era.”202 This particular reform, 
implemented in 2014, was motivated by the MLB’s players, who were dis-
pleased with the persistent use of performance-enhancing substances within 
the league.203 This reform included increased testing, more rigorous penalties, 
and the ability for a player’s penalty to be reduced if the player can prove that 
he did not use the illegal substance to enhance his performance.204 Because the 
MLB model does not have an oversight body such as WADA with which to 
comply, it may act more forgiving in its punishment of its athletes and in de-
fending their reputations.205 Nevertheless, it could also be argued that the cur-
rent WADA Code, at least in some instances, can have the opposite effect—
resulting in disproportionate penalties.206 
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In sum, the league’s players, represented by the Major League Baseball 
Players Association (“MLBPA”), negotiated with the MLB to implement spe-
cific changes to the existing drug testing program, which responded to particu-
lar shortcomings.207 Underscoring the negotiated deal was the influence of the 
MLBPA, which advocated for the players’ preferences in order to bring about 
collaborative change.208 Indeed, the MLBPA has demonstrated itself to be one 
of the strongest labor unions in the United States, and has acted as an effective 
restraint on the league’s own power.209 
In the aftermath of the Essendon decision, the chief of the AFL Players 
Association called for the AFL to withdraw from the WADA Code and advo-
cated for a model of self-governance, similar to the MLB.210 Consistent with 
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this response, the head of a labor organization “that represents . . . athletes . . . 
through players’ associations, including the AFL Players Association” argued 
that to mitigate future criticisms that may arise from a doping decision similar 
to Essendon, a collective bargaining framework should be implemented, such 
as that in place in the MLB.211 Supporting this argument, the concerns that 
prompted the 2014 MLB reform are analogous to those concerns present in 
cases at the CAS such as Essendon.212 Moreover, the manner in which the 
2014 MLB reform was developed—by engaging athletes and league manage-
ment in negotiations in which athletes actively participated—was a significant 
factor in the success of its enactment.213 
The benefit of the 2014 MLB reform—athlete-motivated negotiations 
with the league resulting in distinct changes to the league’s anti-doping poli-
cy—could also be beneficial to other sport leagues, such as the AFL.214 If ath-
letes within other sports governing bodies undertake reforms similar to that of 
the MLB in 2014, the benefits could be preserved and maximized by amending 
the CAS Code, resulting in a Code that is more responsive to athletes’ inter-
ests.215 
C. Amendments to the CAS Code 
Amendments to the CAS Code could ease the concerns articulated in Sec-
tions A and B of this Part, as well as protect any benefits produced by greater 
cooperation between athletes and sport organizations.216 Moreover, adopting a 
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new provision providing for more stringent grounds for appeal could mitigate 
the effects of allowing parties such as WADA to appeal to the CAS in arbitra-
tion clauses.217 A model provision can be found in the American Arbitration 
Association’s (“AAA”) Optional Appellate Arbitration Rules.218 The relevant 
AAA provision provides that “[a] party may appeal on the grounds that the 
[arbitral award] is based upon: (1) an error of law that is material and prejudi-
cial; or (2) determinations of fact that are clearly erroneous.”219 This is more 
restrictive than the current CAS provision, which permits the CAS to conduct 
an entirely fresh review of the facts and the law.220 
For a party to file an appeal with the CAS, it would still need to meet the 
requirements for CAS appellate jurisdiction set forth in the current CAS provi-
sion.221 Nonetheless, an additional provision such as the AAA provision de-
scribed above could act as a check on the CAS’s jurisdictional rules.222 Ulti-
mately, such a provision may prohibit an organization, such as WADA in the 
Essendon case, from appealing a lower decision that was unfavorable to the 
organization, unless there is a significant error of law or factual determination 
at the first instance tribunal.223 Athletes, however, could suffer under such an 
amendment, if the ruling was unfavorable toward them.224 Nonetheless, ath-
letes could alleviate this problem by engaging in discussions with the league or 
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governing sport organization in order to amend the governing rules to better 
reflect athlete interests.225 
Related to limiting the grounds for appeal, the CAS Code could also be 
amended to set forth a harder stance than the current CAS Code on the admis-
sibility of new claims or evidence on appeal.226 Namely, the CAS provision 
describing the scope of review on appeal could be amended by inserting lan-
guage from an AAA provision that states the requirements in arranging the ap-
pellate record.227 More precisely, the AAA provision’s bar on the introduction 
of new evidence or issues could replace the current CAS language, which 
grants the appellate panel the option of—as opposed to the prohibition on—
excluding new evidence if it was obtainable or could have been obtainable be-
fore the first-instance decision was made.228 
Thus, the AAA provision, which provides in relevant part that “[a] party 
may not present for the first time on appeal an issue or evidence that was not 
raised during the [first-instance] arbitration hearing” could replace the relevant 
portion of the CAS provision, which states that “[t]he panel has discretion to 
exclude evidence presented by the parties if it was available to them or could 
reasonable have been discovered by them before the challenged decision was 
rendered.”229 This change could, consistent with employing a more deferential 
standard of review, increase predictability and decrease costs for athletes in 
appellate proceedings.230 Finally, disadvantages flowing from more deference 
to the first-instance arbitration could be remedied by engaging athletes in ne-
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ing text. 
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gotiations with their governing sport organizations.231 Overall, such negotia-
tions could lead to more effective and sensible doping enforcement policies.232 
CONCLUSION 
Although the developments of the CAS and the WADA both addressed 
past issues in sport and encourage uniformity and efficiency, recent develop-
ments involving the CAS and WADA have led to the examination of the proper 
balance between the athletes and sport organizations. Although past allegations 
of bias and lack of independence of the CAS have led to structural reforms, 
more reform is necessary so that athletes may feel more confident and better 
represented in the arbitration process at the CAS. Moreover, in doping appeals 
at the CAS, the Essendon case illustrates the potential for inconsistent out-
comes between tribunals. This lack of consistency has led to questioning of the 
effectiveness of the WADA Code, especially with respect to team sports. This 
concern —that, in appeals to the CAS, the WADA Code does not adequately 
meet athlete interests—could be alleviated with an increased dialogue between 
athletes and their governing bodies. Finally, the benefits from this increased 
athlete-governing body dialogue could be solidified by specific amendments to 
the CAS Code, which would provide deference to tailored policies developed 
in fair negotiations between specific athletes and their governing body. 
DAVID MAHONEY 
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